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Each computer on a network has an OS Fingerprint that can be collected through 
various applications.  Because of the complexity of network systems, vulnerabilities and 
exploitations of the same to gain access to systems will always be a problem.  Those 
wishing to attack a system can use the OS Fingerprint to identify the types of 
vulnerabilities and software exploits that will be effective against the system.  This paper 
discusses how system vulnerabilities become exploited and used by network attackers. 
Because OS Fingerprints are one of many tools network attackers will use to identify and 
attack a system, concealing a system’s OS Fingerprint becomes an important part of 
securing that system.  To demonstrate the capability of concealing the OS Fingerprint of 
a system, a prototype system was developed.  This prototype changed the OS Fingerprint 
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This paper discusses how system vulnerabilities become exploited and used by 
network attackers.   Because OS Fingerprints are one of many tools network attackers 
will use to identify and attack a system, concealing a system’s OS Fingerprint becomes 
an important part of securing that system.  To demonstrate the capability of concealing 
the OS Fingerprint of a system, a prototype system was developed.  This prototype 
changed the OS Fingerprint of a Linux system so that it matched a Windows NT system.  
This effort found that OS Fingerprints can be changed by making configuration changes 
to default OS kernel software and by compiling a custom OS kernel with modified source 
code.  OS Fingerprints may change as more varied systems and hardware are available 
and used.  Managing the OS Fingerprint of a network system is an additional way to help 
protect the system from attack and should be considered as part of a comprehensive 



























A. NETWORK SECURITY AND ATTACK PROFILE  
There is no such thing as perfect security.  A computer that is not even connected 
to a network is still subject to risk from an operator with access to the console.  Once the 
system is attached to a network, the number of possible access sites grows to include 
every computer in that network.   Computer systems use multiple levels of software to 
abstract the complex operations of the computer such as video output, keyboard input, 
network and hard drive access.  These hardware abstractions are managed by the software 
in the Operating System (OS).  The OS uses hardware drivers to control the various 
hardware components.  The primary function of the OS is to control access to these 
varied hardware components and avoid conflicts between users and applications.  The OS 
also has Application Programming Interface (API) that other software applications use to 
access the hardware.    
Because of these layers of abstraction, there is also a need for layers of security.  
A software application can be more secure.  But once an attacker has gained access to the 
OS, he can then take control of the application.  If the OS is more secure, an attacker can 
take control of a trusted application to gain access to parts of the computer that the OS is 
trying to secure. 
Network security is an ongoing process that requires the ever vigilant attention of 
an experienced system administrator.  Each level of abstraction in the computer system 
needs to be maintained for security [1, 2, 3].  With the ever growing complexity and size 
of systems and applications, new vulnerabilities emerge.  It is possible to eliminate some 
of these vulnerabilities by modifying the software, or through other configurations or 
restrictions to limit access to unauthorized users or applications.  Every computer system 
relies on hundreds of applications, components, libraries, drivers, files and 
configurations.  All of which can become a target once a vulnerability is found.  New 
methods of attacking a computer system are being created each day, and as new 
vulnerabilities are being discovered in existing software systems.  Even when software  
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systems are modified to eliminate a known vulnerability, the modifications can 
potentially introduce new vulnerabilities.  Thus the never ending search for security will 
continue. 
Computer systems with vulnerabilities to a network attack can be exploited by 
any computer with access to the network.  Protecting the system from network attacks 
becomes important.  Some methods used to protect computer systems from network-
based attacks include: limiting the number and type of network services being provided, 
restricting access to specific computers and services with a firewall, restricting access to 
specific user accounts, keeping OS and network software patched and updated.   These 
restrictions can help protect a computer system on the network, but at the cost of limiting 
operations to a defined set of trusted users and network systems. In addition, there may 
be new vulnerabilities that will be discovered.  There may be new applications that are 
not yet installed that can introduce new types of vulnerabilities and may not be 
compatible with this restrictive firewall solution.   Once an attacker accesses the network 
beyond the firewall, the protection it provided can be circumnavigated. 
There are essentially two different types of network attacks, novice and expert 
attackers.  The novice attacker, also known as “Script Kiddies,” is able to attack a system 
using programs and libraries created by other more skilled attackers.  Because these types 
of attacks do not require advanced understanding of computers, these attacks are the most 
common.  Fortunately the vulnerabilities that these novice attackers apply tend to become 
well known, with patches and configuration changes becoming available to nullify the 
effectiveness of the script-kiddy attack program.  A novice attacker may not even know 
how the scripted attack works, or what vulnerability or system it will work against.  
These attackers succeed because so many users and maintainers of computer systems fail 
to patch even the most basic vulnerabilities in a timely manner.  As with random 
violence, it is nearly impossible to avoid being targeted by attackers.  Vigilant patching 
and configuring of the system needs to be a part of organizations’ and individuals’ 
approach to maintaining secure operation of computer systems.  By attacking randomly 
computer systems that are not vulnerable to the specific attack, a novice attacker may be  
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detected before targeting an actual vulnerable system.  This can allow the vulnerable 
systems to be protected by blocking all access from the computer where the attacks are 
coming from. 
At the other end of the spectrum are attackers who are highly skilled at 
developing software and have deep knowledge of the systems they are attacking; these 
people may even be professional information warriors, of sorts, sponsored by organized 
crime, terrorist groups, or governments (e.g., military or intelligence agencies).  These 
attackers study the applications they are trying to attack.  They will try to decompile the 
application back into its original source code, run the application in a virtual environment 
to observe its operation, study the database and file structures applications and system-
level software use, and where possible, obtain source code and document of the 
application or system artifacts (e.g., requirements specifications, design documents, user 
manuals).  All of these activities require strong understanding of the design and operation 
of the system across the many levels of abstraction.  These attackers look for 
vulnerabilities that are not yet well known or possibly have not already been uncovered:  
these vulnerabilities provide the professional hacker with the opportunity to experiment 
and test a specific attack on the vulnerability.  Newly discovered vulnerabilities can 
depend on multiple levels of system abstraction in their complexity.  This means that the 
attack may only work on one specific OS and one specific software version.  It is unusual 
for a vulnerability to be generic enough that it will apply to multiple applications and 
operating systems, but it could occur due to software side effects (i.e., unplanned or 
unforeseen interactions between units of software).  A new vulnerability may be 
backward compatible, applying to previous versions of a specific application.  This 
attacker can test this new vulnerability on a system that he controls until he is confident 
that it will work on a real target.  Once the vulnerability is widely known a new version 
of the application will be released to patch the vulnerability and a newer version of the 
application will no longer be affected by the same attack.   
As the new attack is being tested and developed it will usually only be used on a 
limited number of machines and used by a limited number of attackers.  Later these 
attacks can be written into scripts that less-skilled users can add to their arsenal of cyber-
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attack tools.  A new exploit can remain unknown until revealed when the novice attacker 
uses the simplified tool or script.  These less experienced hackers tend to be less careful, 
make more mistakes and leave evidence of their activities.  By the time these scripts or 
tools are available; the new vulnerability could have been exploited for a long time and 
not been detected.  These unknown exploits are the most dangerous to network systems 
since no defenses are even available and no patches have been written. 
An experienced attacker can perfect the new attack incrementally.  First he will 
try to test and use the attack in a limited way.  This experienced attacker will carefully 
select a target computer.  He will try to search the network to find a system that matches 
his attack requirements.  The system must have the same OS and software version.   To 
determine this, the attacker will use tools to scan the network.  By protecting a computer 
from successful network scans, the amount of intelligence a potential attacker can gather 
decreases and security of the network system increases.   Protecting a network system 
from network scans is an important step in securing a network system from information 
warfare [4]. 
B. NETWORK SCANNING 
A network scan is the process of attempting to open network connections on 
network ports of a network host [5].  The process of scanning a network computer uses 
the same protocols and procedures to make a legitimate connection.  The only way to 
block a network scan is to limit the hosts and systems that can connect to the system 
being protected.  
The first method of scanning a host is to send a PING request through TCP packet 
using ICMP [6].  ICMP is a protocol within the TCP protocol that allows for normal 
routing control.  A PING packet will echo through the network and be replied by the host 
addressed in the packet.  PING is a useful tool to determine if a machine is actively on 
the internet, disconnected or off.  But it also allows an attacker to determine if the 
machine is on and thereby narrow his list of possible targets from all network addresses 
to only active hosts.  Because of this firewalls can block ICMP packets to protected 
systems.  The PING scan reveals only limited information, whether the network host is 
on or off, and is one of the least effective scans an attacker can use.  The PING scan can 
be blocked by a firewall, but because detecting if a network host is active is a useful 
5 
operation for normal network operation, this tends to degrade the normal operation of the 
network.  Still, many network firewalls block PING packets to attempt to protect their 
systems from PING scans.   
A PING scan cannot reveal many of the details an experienced attacker will need 
to know to craft an attack, such as which OS the system is running or what applications 
or services are available.  Another type of network scan is a TCP port scan.  This scan 
can reveal to the attacker which ports are open for connections and which are not.  
Normally applications create connections to ports that allow them to send and receive 
data.  In a TCP port scan the normal network connection is limited to either a simple start 
up connection or a request to close the connection.  Either can result in a response that 
will identify if the targeted port is open.   
Each port has a specific number.  Applications use “well known ports” to make 
finding applications on a specific machine possible without needing to attempt 
connections to all possible ports.  Some examples of well known ports include port 80 for 
HTTP Web page services, port 25 for SMTP email services, port 21 for FTP, port 23 for 
TELNET console commands, port 22 for SSH secure console, port 110 for Pop3 email 
transport, and port 443 for HTTPS encrypted Web page services.  There are up to 65,535 
possible TCP ports, of which the first 2000 are allocated as “well known ports” for 
system services.  An attacker can determine which services are running on the target host 
by looking at which well known ports are open. 
At this point an attack can identify what hosts are active on the network (with a 
PING scan) and what services are available on that host (with a TCP port scan).  The 
attacker still needs to identify which OS and applications are being used.  It is possible to 
have several different vendors or applications that provide the same service.   One 
machine might use window IIS for its Web server on port 80 while another would use 
Linux and Apache for the same Web server service.  Each of these applications are 
created from different vendors and therefore do not normally have the same 
vulnerabilities.  In the above example the Apache server has been ported to many 
different OSes, so even knowing which application is running does not necessarily reveal 
which OS it is running on.  Each OS uses different directory structures for applications, 
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different system call libraries, and different system accounts that need to be used for an 
successful attack. 
To determine what application and OS is running on the port, an attacker can try 
to grab a “Banner” or login message.  Many services will identify themselves during 
normal communication.   For instance a connection to a telnet server may reveal 
 
 
Figure 1.   Telnet Banner Capture 
 
This banner message is created by the application and serves the purpose of 
helping other applications or operators to identify which system may offer specific 
methods.  Sometimes the banner messages are necessary so applications can determine 
which version of the communication protocol to use.   
 
Figure 2.   SSH Banner Capture 
 
Some banner messages can be a gold mine to potential attackers.  The above 
telnet banner reveals way too much information.  Any network computer can connect 
without being challenged for a user login and can see the OS type (RedHat Linux) 
version (Shrike AKA RedHat 9.0) and kernel version (2.4.20-30.9) even the system 
architecture (i686).  But banner messages are not fool proof.  There is no guarantee that 
this information is accurate.  A banner message can easily be modified to give no 
information or even false information.   
Network scanning tools tend to have patterns in their search of the available ports 
of a target system that a human or tool can detect [7].  In an attempt to thwart network 
scans, tools have been written that can detect when a scan is taking place and from where 
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it is coming.  By detecting a network scan’s unusual packets, ports accessed and packet 
order, a network scan detection tool can then block further network traffic coming from 
the known scanning computer.  The detection capabilities have increased pressure on 
scanning tools and methods of scanning that are harder to detect such as FIN, stealth, 
slow and passive scanning. 
C. OS FINGERPRINTING WITH TCP/IP 
It is possible to use a network scan to determine the type of OS by identifying 
specific variations within the TCP/IP packet [8].  Each OS uses a different 
implementation of the TCP/IP protocol. The protocol was designed to be configurable 
and extendable.  Since each OS can implement the TCP/IP protocol in slightly different 
ways, it is possible to determine which OS created the TCP/IP packet by looking at the 
details within the specific fields.  While the TCP/IP fields do not actually carry a banner 
that identifies the OS, the variations are predictable, and by creating a library of OSes and 
their TCP/IP field variations it is possible to “fingerprint” an OS. 
OS Fingerprints are a side effect of OS software design and engineering.  When 
TCP/IP packets and connections are managed by the OS they are optimized and 
specialized for the particular hardware and configuration being used.  The benefit of this 
optimization and customization may be out weighed by the risk of revealing details about 
the system to potential attackers on the network.  As a Software System Engineering 
solution, the OS Fingerprint of a system should be carefully managed and controlled.  A 
careful examination of the benefits of optimization and customization should be weighed 
against the risk of revealing unwanted information. 
A TCP/IP fingerprint is a record of variations of the TCP/IP headers.   This 
fingerprint can verify an OS even with a falsified banner.  The Nmap tool was the first 
tool to use this technology [9], and it is still the standard for TCP/IP port scanning and 
OS Fingerprinting. These variations result from the different way that each OS 
implements the TCP/IP protocols from the RFCs where they are specified.   
1. Options 
Because these protocols are designed to be modified and extended they were 
designed to be changeable with an option field.  These changes are designed to be 
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backwards compatible so those computers that don’t implement the changes can still 
interoperate with computers that do.    These changes or extensions help to improve the 
TCP/IP protocol performance or security.  The TCP header sets aside a number of bits to 
identify which options are enabled.  In some cases the OS will only implement part of the 
protocol and leave out optional features.  Some of the TCP options that are commonly 
used in OS Fingerprinting are: 
a. Timestamp 
The timestamp option records the current time in a TCP packet that 
is sent over the internet.  When this packet arrives at its target the time value is echoed 
back to the sender.  This allows the sender to determine the round trip time for packets 
sent to that host and enables the host to optimize its TCP/IP protocol for maximum 
throughput, by allowing the remote computer to send multiple TCP packets while it 
waits for acknowledgements of their receipt. 
b. Window Scale 
This option is used to increase performance of high speed networks 
with relatively high latency by allowing the window size to scale above the normal 
32,767 maximum by multiplying the advertised window size by the window scale value. 
c. NOP (No Operation) 
This option is used to add space to make the entire option field fit 
into a 32 bit word as required by the TCP protocol specification. 
d. Maximum Segment Size (MSS) 
MSS is used to specify the largest segment or packet that can be 
transmitted without requiring fragmentation.  This value usually is set based on the type 
of network connection and media used to transfer data. 
This value is determined by the media (i.e. twisted pair, fiber optic 
wire, wireless radio, etc) that is used to transport the data between computers.  By 
supporting the MSS option the TCP/IP stack can agree on the segment size that is most 




e. Order of Options and Spacing 
In some cases the OS will simply select the ordering of fields 
differently but within the protocol.   In the TCP protocol the options field doesn’t 
specify an order for the options only that they must fit into a full 32 bit word.   This 
gives the OS writers great flexibility in how to implement these options.   Some OSes 
use NOPs after each option to keep the total field length at 32 bits, while others always 
end with the Timestamp option.   But this variation can be specific.  (i.e. NetBSD will 
always have the Window Scale option before the Time Stamp option, where Linux will 
always have the Window Scale option after the Time Stamp option). 
2. Implementation 
In some cases the OS fails to correctly implement the protocol and errors are 
detectable, while not necessarily disrupting the capability of the TCP/IP protocol to 
work [10].  While these errors don’t tend to disrupt the normal use of the system, they 
can lead to unexpected behavior.   These errors are especially visible when one type of 
OS is connecting to a computer using another.  If both OSes don’t correctly implement 
the protocol, errors can occur and performance can suffer.  Some examples of these 
include incorrectly responding to a FIN/ACK packet or accepting options in packets 
other than in the SYN packet.  These options are only allowed in the setup portion of the 
TCP/IP protocol, but some OSes accept them in other packet messages.  Sometimes 
these discrepancies between the OS implementation of the TCP/IP protocol and the 
correct implementation can result in errors that can crash the system as a result of certain 
types of TCP/IP packets received.   The windows “SMURF” DOS (Denial of Service) 
attack was one of these.  It used an invalid fragment of a packet that overloaded the 
windows network stack and crashed the entire system [11, 12]. 
a. UDP Port Closed 
Some OSes incorrectly send a UDP port closed message to respond to 
invalid UDP requests, while others echo incorrect packet fields or send a template 
generated packet of a constant length. 
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b. IP Do Not Fragment 
IP Do not fragment is a bit set in a TCP/IP packet to ensure that a packet 
will not be broken up by network systems as it travels to its destination.  The 
implementation of this protocol function can vary, and in some cases this can cause 
errors in connections between some systems. 
c. TCP Initial Window Size 
This option is used to advertise that buffer window that is available for 
TCP packets on the host.  This allows for maximum throughput of network packets and 
minimizes delay when large amounts of data are being sent.  Not all OSes correctly 
implement this option to reflect the sizes of their buffers.  Some OSes also simply echo 
received size in return messages, others use a constant window size, and some OSes 
have limited memory and must use a much smaller window size. 
3. Predictable Value 
In some cases the OS will choose predictable values for fields that are convenient 
for the OS and not specified in the protocol.  These predictable values are found in the 
advertised window size.  The OS uses a memory management system to allocate space 
to hold TCP/IP packets as they are received.   By using a standard allocation method the 
OS can efficiently use its memory and maximize the potential throughput of the packets, 
but this also means that the advertised window size can reveal details of the type and 
version of the OS. 
Because TCP/IP packets are transported over an unreliable network, each TCP/IP 
packet also has sequence numbers to help the packets be reconstructed in the right order 
and to rebuild packets from fragments that may have occurred.  These sequence numbers 
are increased with each packet that is sent or received.  Since each connection needs a 
new set of sequence numbers the OS needs to generate a starting or seed number for 
each connection.  Each OS creates these sequence numbers in a different way.  Some 
methods of generating sequence numbers creates the potential for session hijacking by 
an attacker guessing the sequence number and submitting malicious TCP/IP packets 
with forged headers and sequence numbers to take over the connection of another user.  
Some OSes use sequence numbers that have only 65,535 unique values other use up to 
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10,737,254,420 (65,535 * Maximum Window Scale of 16,384) possible values.  The 
larger the number of values the safer the system is from session hijacking. 
D. OS FINGERPRINTS USES 
An OS Fingerprint can contain a unique description of the OS and version 
running on the host.  These variations usually have little to no effect on the operation of 
the system itself.  They tend to only affect the way the system is optimized to operate 
over the network.  But different versions and types of OS will still have variations that 
result in changes visible in the TCP/IP packets that would normally be unnoticed to the 
users of a system.   
Because an OS Fingerprint can be specific as to which version an OS is, it can be 
used to identify specific systems that contain known vulnerabilities.  The OS Fingerprint 
can be more accurate than simply “Banner Grabbing”, since banners can easily be forged 
or even removed entirely.  In addition, OS Fingerprinting works on systems that don’t 
even have services that normally provide banners to grab. 
There are currently many network tools that capture and use OS Fingerprints.  
These tools are used by hackers and system administrators for different purposes.  An 
attacker would look for known weaknesses by OS and version, where a system 
administrator may use OS Fingerprints to enhance his firewall settings and restrict OS 
types that are known to be vulnerable to worms from using certain service (i.e. Email).  
Either way OS Fingerprints are becoming a useful artifact of a network connection that 
users may or may not want to be available or captured by other systems.  
1. Nmap 
Nmap was one of the first network port scanning tools to use OS Fingerprinting 
from TCP/IP packets [13].   As a port scanner, Nmap is designed to search a target host 
for all open ports.  This allows the user to determine what services may be available on a 
system.  It also allows an administrator to determine which services have correctly been 
locked down and which have not.  Nmap was designed as an attacker’s tool by including 
specialized scan options such as spoofing false sources for scanning packets, scanning 
with half open connections, scanning with FIN packets and by scanning slowly to avoid 
detection.  By adding OS Fingerprinting Nmap became the de facto standard tool for 
network scanning. 
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Nmap was first released September 1997 and has archived versions from 1.25 to 
2.53.  Over the past several years it has grown and changed until now.  The current 
version 3.8-1 has added new capabilities and functionality over the original. 
Nmap uses a series of TCP/IP and UDP packet messages to collect the OS 
Fingerprint from a remote host.  The responses are compared to an extensive library of 
over 1300 known OS Fingerprints that have been collected by users across the internet.  
Recently Nmap has built-in additional capabilities such as port application service 
detection by attempting to grab the connection banners and comparing that to a library 
of known banners as well. 
2. p0f 
p0f is a similar OS Fingerprint detection tool [14] , but differs from Nmap in that 
it uses passive detection.  That means instead of sending out collection requests to the 
target machine, it listens to messages coming to the local machine from remote 
machines and at that point attempts to detect the OS Fingerprint from captured TCP/IP 
packets[15].  This approach protects the attacker from having his scan detected.  Some 
firewalls detect network scans and block hosts that try to run active network scans. 
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II. OS FINGERPRINT CHANGING 
A. HOW OS FINGERPRINTS CAN BE CHANGED 
Because TCP/IP fingerprinting effectively broadcasts your OS identification to 
any network host that can send or receive packets, it becomes important to be able to 
control access to or limit accuracy of the TCP/IP fingerprint of a system from other 
untrusted systems and users. 
A TCP/IP fingerprint can be partially protected by using a firewall to block 
certain types of packets [7, 16].  Sometimes a firewall will effectively block a TCP/IP 
fingerprint, but not always.  Nmap can use partial matches and account for packets that 
may be dropped by a firewall.  A complete TCP/IP fingerprint can be made from only 
one open port to the host machine even through a NAT (network address translation) 
forwarded port [17]. 
Because TCP/IP fingerprinting uses a library of known OS Fingerprints small 
changes in the TCP/IP operations of the host computer can conceal the OS by making 
only minor changes to its TCP/IP operation.   Any change outside the bounds of known 
OS Fingerprints will result in an unidentified OS Fingerprint.   
Although this may defeat some attackers from quickly determining the correct OS 
Fingerprint for the modified system, a more persistent attacker will be able to compare 
the fingerprint collected with known fingerprints to determine which OS is the “most 
likely” match.  In addition, some simple changes to the OS are more common to be used 
by other systems and therefore they may already be in the fingerprint library used.   Many 
OSes have configuration options that can change the OS Fingerprint and may be useful 
for certain network configurations.   
So attempting to change the OS Fingerprint of a system is best achieved by 
closely matching a known system rather than making changes to just change the original 
OS Fingerprint.  Changing the system away from the true system will only lead to OS 
Fingerprinting tools that will use statistical estimation to determine the most likely 
system based on the type of changes found. 
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B. DYNAMIC CHANGES 
A network fingerprint does not have to be a constant and unchanging value.  The 
methods used to determine an OS Fingerprint simply use certain types of TCP/IP packets 
to gather known responses and then compare those responses to a lookup table of known 
values for known OSes.  It is possible for an OS to change the way it responds to these 
TCP/IP packets dynamically during operation. 
It’s important to note that many operating systems have customizable settings for 
how the network stack operates.  These settings can allow various aspects of the TCP/IP 
fingerprint to be changed.   For instance it may be possible to configure the amount of 
memory that the system uses for each network connection.  By changing the memory 
allocation model, you may increase or decrease performance, but as a side effect, the 
Window Size and Window Scale values of the OS Fingerprint may change as well.   
Other system settings allow administrators to configure other details of the OS finger 
print.  An example of this is in Linux system it’s possible to turn off the TCP option for 
Time Stamp or the Window Scaling by using a “sysctl” command. 
Many operating systems have configurations and settings that affect the way 
TCP/IP packets are created and sent out on the network.  Many of these settings and 
configurations are available to system administrators to change dynamically.  But not all 
aspects of the TCP/IP fingerprint can be changed simply by modifying these settings.  
Some fingerprint characteristics can only be changed by directly modifying the original 
system kernel or by making changes to the TCP/IP packets in an application that run like 
a firewall on the system.  Changing the OS kernel will require the system to be rebooted 
to make the changes effective.  Changing the OS setting does not always require the 
system to be rebooted.  Applications like firewalls are designed to allow changes to be 
made dynamically with out rebooting. 
C. RELATED WORKS 
There are several different ways to control or protect the OS Fingerprint of a 
system.  All of the approaches focus on changing the TCP/IP packets that are transferred 




1. Packet Creation 
This is the approach used in this effort.  This approach focused on modifying the 
TCP/IP packets as they are created in the OS kernel prior to being sent out over the 
network.  This approach can work on an OS that has full access to configuration and 
source code or the OS is designed with application interfaces to modify packets prior to 
sending them out.   Because OS Fingerprinting uses both TCP/IP packet and UDP 
packet, multiple changes will be needed to fully control the OS Fingerprint. 
2. Packet Filtering 
This approach uses firewall rules and interfaces to capture packets as they are 
leaving a system whether they are created locally or just passing through a gateway.  
TCP/IP packets can either be modified or blocked by a filter.   
When modifying packets, care must be taken to not break operational 
requirements of the protocol or system.  Response packets must also be captured and 
rewritten to match the original unmodified packets so the original system will recognize 
them as correct responses.  Blocking packets can also confuse OS Fingerprint scans by 
not allowing them to capture the complete OS Fingerprint and may result in an 
ambiguous OS Fingerprint result [12, 18].   
One example of packet filtering for OS Fingerprint protection is the OpenBSD PF 
firewall configuration.  PF firewall can correct or block TCP/IP packets that fail to 
correctly implement the RFC and other restrictions [16].  This firewall can reassemble 
TCP/IP fragments before they are processed by the OS to avoid possible errors these 
fragments may cause and also allow filters to block or correct other TCP/IP packets with 
fields in invalid states. The firewall can block invalid packets such as a SYN/FIN, 
ACK/FIN and TCP/IP options in packets other than SYN.  The firewall grabs the 
TCP/IP packet and checks it to be sure its valid and normalizes it before allowing it to be 
processed by the rest of the system.  This can limit the ability of any OS detection tool to 
gather an OS Fingerprint of a system behind the firewall. 
3. Packet Correction and Verification 
This approach works on a similar approach as packet filtering, but instead of 
arbitrarily modifying or blocking packets, it focuses on correcting errors and invalid  
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values in packets.  A packet correction and verification system will block invalid RST 
packets, reassemble fragmented packets, and can strip out invalid TCP options in 




III. PROTOTYPE AND BEYOND 
A. LINUX TO WINDOWS 
To demonstrate the principles of modification of an OS Fingerprint modification, 
a prototype system called “Neaconing” was developed.  “Neaconing” is a term created 
after the radar term “Meaconing” which means to broadcast false beacon signals to 
confuse and mislead navigation systems.  “Neaconing” is an attempt to falsify a network 
fingerprint of an OS to confuse and mislead network scanning systems.  The prototype 
system was created by modifying an existing operating system so that it matched the OS 
Fingerprint of another.   There were many choices for operating systems to use in this 
prototype.  Choosing the right system can make the process of modifying the OS 
fingerprint harder or easier.       
1. Selecting the OS Fingerprint to Modify 
When selecting an OS for modification as a prototype for OS Fingerprint 
modification, it is important that the OS be easily modified, that the details of the 
implementation or source code be inspectable, and the software and hardware for the OS 
needs to be available.  For this project the Linux OS was selected because it met these 
requirements well.   
The Linux OS is greatly available to modification because it was created and is 
maintained by various contributors around the world as an open source project.  Linux 
demonstrates its ability to be modified by the user with its ability to be maintained by a 
diverse group of developers working collectively on the system independently world 
wide. 
Linux is an open source system, which means the entire OS source code was 
available to change and recompile as a custom system.  It may be possible to apply these 
same principles to other OSes but to do so would require purchasing the software license 
and gaining access to the source code when changes would be required.  
Linux OS is easily acquired and the hardware, software and licensing 
requirements of a system to use, modify, or compile a custom modified Linux OS kernel 
are easily available.  The Linux OS supports many different architectures of hardware 
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and includes the i386 architecture which most home PCs use as well as PPC, Alpha and 
others.  Additionally, being open source also makes the Linux OS inspectable.  The 
entire source code of the Linux kernel can be downloaded by anyone free of charge.  
There are other OSes that are also open source (i.e. NetBSD, FreeBSD, OpenBSD), and 
while these may have also made good candidates for the prototype system, many of the 
other OSes have made design decisions (such as security in OpenBSD and compatibility 
in NetBSD) that may have made some modifications more complicated than in a Linux 
OS.  It would also be possible to modify a proprietary OS, but in order to do so special 
licensing, and nondisclosure agreements would need to be arranged.  In addition the 
results might not even be publishable. 
2. Selecting the OS Fingerprint to Match 
The target OS was chosen to be a Windows NT.  Windows NT has many 
advantages as a target machine.  The primary advantage of using a Windows system as a 
target OS Fingerprint is that currently Windows is the dominate OS on desktop.   
By choosing an extremely obscure target OS, an attacker would have reason to 
doubt the results of the scan.  Who would believe that a network machine serving as a 
service provider would be running on a “Sega Dreamcast game console”? 
Windows has evolved over many versions.  The Windows NT OS was a common 
OS in 1999 when the effort was begun, but the principles used to modify the OS 
Fingerprint would apply equally well to other versions of Windows such as Windows 
2000, XP, and 2003.  Additionally, OS Fingerprints tend to change over time.  Each 
version of Nmap releases updates to the OS Fingerprint database.  As new OS 
configurations or an OS is installed on additional hardware, some times the OS 
Fingerprint can change slightly as memory or CPU speed change.   
3. Collecting and Describing the Original OS Fingerprint 
The first step in changing a Linux System’s OS Fingerprint is to determine what 
the exact fingerprint is.  The fingerprint of the initial system can be collected by using 
the Nmap tool.  On a Linux machine, Nmap can be installed by downloading the source 
code and compiling it, or by downloading an RMP (Red Hat Packet Manger) file and 
installing it with the command “rpm –Uvh”.  Many distributions already include Nmap 
as a system tool, or as an installation optional packet.   
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In order to collect an OS Fingerprint in Nmap the Nmap command must be run 
from a root or admin level console.  This is necessary because Nmap needs to have 
access to create arbitrary TCP/IP packets directly in the OS kernel.  Some of the test 
packets Nmap sends out are invalid and could not be created though non-privileged 
system calls. 
In the original test system was a SuSE 9.2 Linux default installation desktop 
computer running Linux 2.6.X kernel.  The results of the Nmap scan report the 
following: 
 
Table 1. Nmap results for test system OS. 
 
#nmap –O localhost 
 
Starting nmap 3.70 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap/ ) at 2005-03-12 22:46 UTC 
Interesting ports on localhost (127.0.0.1): 
(The 1656 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: closed) 
PORT    STATE SERVICE 
22/tcp  open  ssh 
25/tcp  open  smtp 
111/tcp open  rpcbind 
631/tcp open  ipp 
Device type: general purpose 
Running: Linux 2.4.X|2.5.X|2.6.X 
OS details: Linux 2.5.25 - 2.6.3 or Gentoo 1.2 Linux 2.4.19 rc1-rc7) 
Uptime 0.023 days (since Sat Mar 12 22:14:23 2005) 
 
Nmap run completed -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 6.472 seconds 
 
Occasionally Nmap may return different results for the same OS scan.  This is 
because it may not have enough scan results to distinctly identify the exact OS from 
another.  The Nmap scan returns this alternative result on more than one occasion: 
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Table 2. Nmap additional results for test system OS. 
 
#nmap -O localhost 
 
Starting nmap 3.70 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap/ ) at 2005-03-12 23:01 UTC 
Insufficient responses for TCP sequencing (3), OS detection may be less accurate 
Interesting ports on localhost (127.0.0.1): 
(The 1656 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: closed) 
PORT    STATE SERVICE 
22/tcp  open  ssh 
25/tcp  open  smtp 
111/tcp open  rpcbind 
631/tcp open  ipp 
Device type: general purpose 
Running: Linux 2.4.X|2.5.X|2.6.X 
OS details: Linux 2.4.0 - 2.5.20, Gentoo 1.2 linux (Kernel 2.4.19-gentoo-rc5), Linux 2.4.20, Linux 
2.4.20 - 2.4.22 w/grsecurity.org patch, Linux 2.5.25 - 2.6.3or Gentoo 1.2 Linux 2.4.19 rc1-rc7) 
Uptime 0.033 days (since Sat Mar 12 22:14:23 2005) 
 
Nmap run completed -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 2.455 seconds 
 
 
Nmap determined the OS of this system by looking up the results of its OS scan in 
its database.  The Nmap OS Fingerprint database is located at: 
/usr/share/nmap/nmap-os-fingerprints 
By using the responses from the Nmap OS scan we can create a list of the 
possible matches for our OS in the Nmap fingerprint database.   There are over 1300 
distinct OS Fingerprints in the Nmap fingerprint database.  There are 277 different 
Linux OS Fingerprints and up to five of these OS Fingerprints matched the test system. 
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Table 3. Nmap OS Fingerprint database entries. 
 
Fingerprint Linux 2.4.0 - 2.5.20 
Class Linux | Linux | 2.4.X | general purpose 











# I don't put “Gentoo” as the vendor for the classification because it 
# makes output ugly when there are a bunch of Linux matches due to 
# firewalling or similar problems. 
Fingerprint Gentoo 1.2 linux (Kernel 2.4.19-gentoo-rc5) 











Fingerprint Linux 2.4.20 











# Linux 2.4.20-gentoo-r5 w/grsecurity 
Fingerprint Linux 2.4.20 - 2.4.22 w/grsecurity.org patch 











# Linux matrix 2.6.3-gentoo-r2 x86 
Fingerprint Linux 2.5.25 - 2.6.3 or Gentoo 1.2 Linux 2.4.19 rc1-rc7) 
Class Linux | Linux | 2.4.X | general purpose 
Class Linux | Linux | 2.5.X | general purpose 













By looking up the “Linux 2.5.25 - 2.6.3” or the “Gentoo 1.2 Linux 2.4.19 rc1-rc7” 
we can see the most common match Nmap found for the local scan.  Some of the other 
fingerprints also match and these are also listed as possibilities.  This allows an attacker 
to identify the most likely OS from a list of all.  But each OS in our scan reported Linux 
as the base OS and the only variation was for which distribution or configuration it used. 
Each of these five fingerprints actually represents multiple possible fingerprints.  
Each line represents a test or packet response.  Within these packet responses there may 
be multiple possible values for each field.  These are separated by the symbol “|” for OR, 
and other expressions like “<“ less than, and “>“ greater than.   
When Nmap is unable to identify the OS of a scanned system, it will report the 
fingerprint to the console so it can be collected and added to the Nmap OS database once 
it is known.  In order to collect the exact OS Fingerprint of the test system, the Nmap OS 
Fingerprint database needs to be cleared of all valid values.  This can be done by erasing 
all the data in the /usr/share/nmap/nmap-os-fingerprint file. 
 
Table 4. Clear Nmap OS Fingerprint database. 
 
neuron: #echo ““ >/usr/share/nmap/nmap-os-fingerprint 
 
 
Once the database has been cleared, Nmap will report the exact fingerprint it 
detects on any system. 
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Table 5. Nmap actual OS Fingerprint of original test system. 
 
4. Collecting and Describing the Target OS Fingerprint 
There are 96 different fingerprints for various builds of windows from 3.1 to 
Longhorn, including PDAs and Pocket PC versions. 
There are 277 different fingerprints for various builds of Linux from embedded 
devices to printers and kernel 1.X to kernel 2.6.X. 
By comparing our actual OS Fingerprint we can determine which of the target OS 
Fingerprints are easiest to match. 
Many of the Windows systems have required responses to the T2 test which the 
test system does not respond to as currently configured.  These fingerprints are not good 
candidates. 
The fingerprint that was most similar to the test OS Fingerprint was the 
“Windows NT 3.51 SP5” fingerprint. 
 
 
#nmap –O localhost 
 
Starting nmap 3.70 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap/ ) at 2005-03-12 23:12 UTC 
Interesting ports on localhost (127.0.0.1): 
(The 1656 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: closed) 
PORT    STATE SERVICE 
22/tcp  open  ssh 
25/tcp  open  smtp 
111/tcp open  rpcbind 
631/tcp open  ipp 















Uptime 0.040 days (since Sat Mar 12 22:14:23 2005) 
 
Nmap run completed -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 9.951 seconds 
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Table 6. Nmap database fingerprint of target OS Fingerprint. 
 
# Windows NT 3.51 SP5 
Fingerprint Microsoft Windows NT 3.51 SP5, NT 4.0 or 95/98/98SE 
Class Microsoft | Windows | 95/98/ME | general purpose 












5. Identifying the Necessary Changes to Match OS Fingerprints 
The first step to modify our OS Fingerprint is to identify the differences between 
our OS Fingerprint and the target OS Fingerprint.  The target OS has many possible 
combinations of values that are valid.  For instance the “W” or window size of the T1 
and T3 responses can be 2017 or 3908 or 16D0 or 860 or 4470 or 61ab or 7fff or 8000 or 
869f or 9c40 or faf0.  By selecting this fingerprint as the target these “W” values already 
match the initial OS Fingerprint value of 7fff. 
In test T1 and T3 there are obvious differences.  The “Ops” or TCP Options 
portion of the fingerprint have different values.  The test OS values are “MNNTNW” 
and the target values are “MNWNNT”.  Nmap not only looks for which values the 
fingerprint has (such as M, W, N and T), but it also looks at the order.  So even though 
we have all the same options the order is different.    
 





































act    PU(Resp=N) 
 
Each of these lines of the Nmap fingerprint is described in detail on the Nmap 
Web site http://insecure.org.  But a brief description of each fingerprint component is 
given here to assist the reader. 
 
Table 8. Fingerprint Components. 
 
TSeq – This component of the fingerprint reports the TCP/IP sequencing number 
generation methods used. 
T1 – This component is a SYN packet to an open TCP port. 
T2 – This component is a NULL packet to an open port. 
T3 – This component is a SYN/FIN/URG/PSH packet to an open port. 
T4 – This component is an ACK packet to an open port. 
T5 – This component is a SYN packet to a closed port. 
T6 – This is an ACK packet to a closed port. 
T7 – This is a FIN/URG/PSH packet to a closed port. 
PU – This is a port unreachable response packet. 
 
 
Each of these packets has a complete list of options included to solicit a response 
from the target system of which options it supports.  Other TCP/IP fields are also used 
such as TCP/IP flags, advertised window size, acknowledge sequence number and Do 







6. Process for Changing the OS Fingerprint 
It would be possible to rewrite the code in the kernel that generates the options so 
they list in a different order, but because the target fingerprint also accepts the “M” only 
option, we can also turnoff the “T” timestamp and “W” window scaling options and 
create a match. 
The “T” and “W” options can be configured dynamically in Linux either by using 
the “sysctl” command or by editing the “/proc” file associated with the system variable. 
The “sysctl” command to change these two values is 
 
Table 9. OS Modification 1 - Linux system Sysctl modification commands 
 
neuron:  # sysctl net.ipv4.tcp_timestamps=0 
net.ipv4.tcp_timestamps = 0  
neuron: # sysctl net.ipv4.tcp_window_scaling=0 
net.ipv4.tcp_window_scaling = 0  
 
 





Table 10. OS Modification 1 - Linux system file modification commands 
 
neuron: # echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_timestamps 
neuron: # echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_window_scaling 
 
 
Once these sysctl changes have been made, Nmap reports a different fingerprint.  
This is still a Linux fingerprint, so someone has already realized how this small change 





Table 11. Nmap results for test OS modification 1 
 
neuron:~ # nmap -O localhost 
 
Starting nmap 3.70 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap/ ) at 2005-03-26 19:10 UTC 
Insufficient responses for TCP sequencing (3), OS detection may be less accurate 
Interesting ports on localhost (127.0.0.1): 
(The 1656 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: closed) 
PORT    STATE SERVICE 
22/tcp  open  ssh 
25/tcp  open  smtp 
111/tcp open  rpcbind 
631/tcp open  ipp 
Device type: general purpose 
Running: Linux 2.4.X 
OS details: Linux 2.4.23-grsec w/o timestamps, Linux 2.4.7 (x86) 
 
Nmap run completed -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 2.662 seconds 
 
 
Running Nmap with an empty database shows the complete fingerprint with the 
changes made to the TCP Options. 
 
Table 12. Nmap actual fingerprint for test system OS modification 1 
 
neuron:~ # nmap -O localhost 
 

















At this point many of the T responses are nearly matching the target OS 
Fingerprint.  Looking at each fingerprint result, the differences are as follows. 
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Table 13. Fingerprint with Changes. 
 
T1 is already a match since DF=N matches and the windows size of 7FFF is compatible. 
T2 is already a match.  Response is optional and we currently do not respond. 
T3 is a match since DF=N matches and the windows size of 7FFF is compatible. 
T4 still requires a change to DF=N, but the ACK can be 0 or S++. 
T5 still requires a change to DF=N. 
T6 still requires a change to DF=N, but the ACK can be 0 or S++. 




So the primary change left is to change the DF=Y setting in the test Linux OS 
Fingerprint to match the DF=N in the Windows target OS Fingerprint. 
This change required modifying the Linux kernel.  The Linux kernel is open 
source and free to download and modify.  For most Linux distributions the kernel source 
code can be installed during the initial installation or it can be installed from an RPM 
package.  The source code can also be downloaded from various Web and ftp sites.  
There are many different versions of the Linux kernel.  This paper discusses changes 
made to the Linux kernel version 2.6.8-24.10.i568. 
Before you can modify the source code and build a new kernel, all the 
dependences needed to build the kernel from source must also be installed on the 
system.  These include the gcc compiler and the various kernel-devel rpms depending on 
the configuration of the system. 
Once the kernel source is installed it will be located in the /urs/src/ directory 
under the linux folder.  This folder is actually a link to the actual kernel folder in the 
same directory (/usr/src/).  The actual kernel folder contains the version number in the 
folder name.   
Before making changes to the kernel, the default kernel should be compiled and 
installed to verify that it works correctly.  The process for compiling a kernel for Linux 
can be quite tricky.  There are many hundreds of options to set and choices to be made.  
There are options to build components into the kernel or have them load as modules.  
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It’s also possible to rebuild the kernel using the “old” configuration options once the 
configuration has been initially set. 
 
Table 14. Linux kernel rebuild from source code 
 
neuron:/usr/src/linux #make mrproper 
neuron:/usr/src/linux #make oldconfig 
neuron:/usr/src/linux #make dep 
neuron:/usr/src/linux #make clean 
neuron:/usr/src/linux #make bzImage 
neuron:/usr/src/linux #make modules 
neuron:/usr/src/linux #make modules_install 
 
 
The output of this kernel building is extensive and included as an attachment.  
The final product of the kernel build is a 1.5MByte kernel file “bzImage”.  On a 
development system running on a 1.4Ghz processor the kernel build time was 
approximately 54 minutes. 
This final “bzImage” file needs to be installed into the /boot directory of the 
system along with its System.map file. 
In this case temporary KERNEL_VERSION names of “aaron1” and “aaron2” 
were used to differentiate test kernels from default kernels.   
 
Table 15. Linux kernel install 
 
cp arch/i386/boot/bzImage /boot/bzImager-aaron2 
cp System.map /boot/System.map-aaron2 
ln -s /boot/System.map-aaron2 /boot/System.map 
 
 
The kernel is the foundation element of the OS and is loaded directly from the 
boot loader.  In order for the boot loader to know where to find the kernel the boot 
loader must be configured to use the new kernel.  In a SuSE 9.2 system there are two 
possible boot loaders to use by default.  This test used the Grub boot loader.  Each time a 
new kernel is installed it must be added to the Grub boot loader by inserting these three 
lines to the Grub menu file /boot/grub/menu.lst. 
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Table 16. Linux bootloader configuration 
 
title LINUX-aaron2 
kernel (hd0,2)/boot/vmlinuz-aaron2 root=/dev/hda3 selinux=0 resume=/dev/hda2 showopts 




Once the new Linux kernel is built and installed and configured in the boot 
loader, the system must be restarted.  There is no other way to remove an old kernel and 
start a new one.  During boot up the new kernel is selected from the possible kernels and 
the system start up and runs without error.   
Now it’s time to modify the kernel to change the OS Fingerprint.  The first task is 
to disable IP Do Not Fragment.  There are many places where the Do Not Fragment bit 
is used and set in the kernel source code, but after careful study and experimentation the 
declaration of the Do Not Fragment in the /usr/src/linux/include/net/ip.h file was found 
to be the root configuration and instantiation location.   
By modifying the ip.h file so that the ip_do not_fragment method will always 
return false, all TCP/IP packets will report DF=N.  Below is the code section in the 
/usr/src/linux/include/net/ip.h file that needs to be changed to do this. 
 
Table 17. OS modification 2 - IP Do Not Fragment code change 
 
//ip.h near line 185 
 
static inline 
int ip_dont_fragment(struct sock *sk, struct dst_entry *dst) 
{ 
return 0; 
        //return (inet_sk(sk)->pmtudisc == IP_PMTUDISC_DO || 
        //      (inet_sk(sk)->pmtudisc == IP_PMTUDISC_WANT && 





Once this change is made, the kernel and modules must be rebuilt.  Then when the 
new kernel is installed and configured in the boot loader, the system must be rebooted so 
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the new kernel can be loaded.  Once the new kernel is loaded, the Nmap scan reports the 
following: 
 
Table 18. Nmap actual fingerprint for OS modification 2 
 
neuron: #nmap –O localhost 
 
















No known fingerprints match system fingerprint.  At this point our modifications 
have defeated Nmap’s ability to correctly identify the test system.  Although the changes 
are small enough, a reasonable attempt to guess the OS would still lead us to conclude it 
was a Linux OS.  This new fingerprint shows many actual matches for all the T 
responses of the target system fingerprint.   
 
Table 19. Remaining Fingerprint Issues 
 
T1= match possible. 
T2= match by absence. 
T3= match possible. 
t4= match possible. 
t5= match possible. 
t6= match possible. 
t7= match possible. 
 
This leaves the first TSeq and the last PU responses to be modified.  The TSeq is 
primarily a test for the sequence number of the TCP/IP packets. Few scans actually 
gather enough details to detect how these sequence numbers are generated.  It will not be 
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necessary to change the TSeq for the OS Fingerprint to match since both OSes are 
relatively similar. 
 
Table 20. TSeq Fingerprint Differences 
 
SI  =4E7C3E    need <1F4 
IPID=I       need BI | RP | RD   (all are I or Increasing types) 
 
 
The PU response is a port unreachable response message over the UDP protocol.  
The difference between the target OS and the test kernel response is the IPLEN or IP 
packet length.   
 




IPLEN=164      need 38 
 
 
Because most OSes use a template for sending this standard ICMP response, these 
lengths are different.  There are several different ways to change this value, but all 
require a rewrite of the UDP code in the kernel.  The target OS also can be detected with 
no response to this test message.  This change requires the kernel be further modified so 
that it will silently ignore all UDP messages that would normally generate a Port 
Unreachable message. 
After careful inspection of the kernel source code many file used UDP messages 
and IP packet length. The file /usr/src/linux/included/net/ipv4/udp.c has a method 
udp_rcv() that routes UDP packets.  If the UDP packet does not have a valid port to be 
delivered to it falls out the bottom of the method and is dropped.  But just before the end 
of the method there is a call to icmp_send(skb, ICMP_DEST_UNREACH, 
ICMP_PORT_UNREACH, 0 ).  This generates and sends the port unreachable message 
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in reply to these soon to be dropped packets.  By commenting out this line, all port 
unreachable messages will be silently dropped with no reply. 
 
Table 22. OS modification 3 - UDP Port Unreachable code change 
 
///usr/src/included/net/ipv4/udp.c about line 1172 
 //icmp_send(skb,ICMP_DEST_UNREACH, ICMP_PORT_UNREACH, ); 
 
 
This change requires that a new kernel be built.  This kernel was called version 
“aaron2” and installed in the Grub loader.   
7. Resulting OS Fingerprint 
With this second kernel rebuild running Nmap OS detection returns the following 
 
Table 23. Nmap results for test OS modification 3 
 
neuron: # nmap –O localhost 
 
Starting nmap 3.70 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap/ ) at 2005-03-26 14:57 UTC 
Insufficient responses for TCP sequencing (1), OS detection may be less accurate 
Interesting ports on localhost (127.0.0.1): 
(The 1656 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: closed) 
PORT    STATE SERVICE 
22/tcp  open  ssh 
25/tcp  open  smtp 
111/tcp open  rpcbind 
631/tcp open  ipp 
Device type: general purpose 
Running: Microsoft Windows 95/98/ME|NT/2K/XP 
OS details: Microsoft Windows NT 3.51 SP5, NT 4.0 or 95/98/98SE 
 
Nmap run completed -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 2.396 seconds 
 
 
To an Nmap scan, this Linux 2.6.X system appears to be a windows NT 3.51 SP 5 
system. 
 
Table 24. Nmap actual fingerprint for test OS modification 3 
 
neuron:~ # nmap -O localhost 
 
Starting nmap 3.70 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap/ ) 
at 2005-03-27 20:49 UTC 
Insufficient responses for TCP sequencing (1), OS 
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detection may be less accurate 
Insufficient responses for TCP sequencing (1), OS 
detection may be less accurate 
Insufficient responses for TCP sequencing (2), OS 
detection may be less accurate 
Interesting ports on localhost (127.0.0.1): 
(The 1656 ports scanned but not shown below are in 
state: closed) 
PORT    STATE SERVICE 
22/tcp  open  ssh 
25/tcp  open  smtp 
111/tcp open  rpcbind 
631/tcp open  ipp 
No OS matches for host (If you know what OS is running 














Nmap run completed -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned 
in 9.982 seconds 
 
This new fingerprint falls within the known possible fingerprints of a Windows 
NT system.  Whether or not this is a common fingerprint for a Windows NT system, or 
even an actual fingerprint and not a mismatch of partial fingerprints remains to be seen.  
Without having all possible Windows NT systems to generate all possible Windows NT 
fingerprints, the Nmap fingerprint database will have to make the final determination.  
The Windows NT OS Fingerprint has changed from Nmap version 2.54 to version 2.73.  
The changes made in this effort do not work for all versions of Nmap, and may not work 
for future versions.  The only way to guarantee a match is to collect an OS Fingerprint of 
a target system and exactly match it and not depend on Nmap fingerprint database 
values. 
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B. COMPUTER LEVEL PROTECTION 
It’s possible for each computer to be modified to change its OS Fingerprint.  This 
can be done by following some of the guidance above such as “sysctils” or actually 
modifying the system kernel. 
While most types of operating systems have some capability similar to “sysctils” 
not all allow users to access the source code of the kernel to modify and build specialty 
kernels that can disguise the OS Fingerprint.  Specifically proprietary OSes like Windows 
and HP Unix do not allow developers access to modify the OS kernel with out special 
arrangements. 
C. GATEWAY PACKET SCRUBBING  
Another approach other than modifying each system individually to disguise the 
OS Fingerprint is to have the gateway or firewall computer intercept and modify the 
packets as they are passed through to remove or modify the parts of the TCP/IP packet 
that would reveal the OS Fingerprint.  In part a normal firewall can do some of this since 
it may simply block much of the TCP/IP packets that a network fingerprint scan would 
need to create.  This is because many of the packets used to scan for the OS Fingerprint 
actually contain invalid sequences such as ACK/FIN and options in packets other than 
the SYN, or UDP packets to closed ports.  While a firewall may be a good start, it clearly 
isn’t enough since many OS Fingerprints can be determined with only one open port to 
the host.  The solution is to have the gateway computer process each packet and filter out 
specific values that are optional and modify packet header values that are changeable. 
D. FINGERPRINTING IN OTHER SYSTEMS 
1. Hubs & Routers  
While most users are blissfully unaware of how network traffic is transferred from 
host to host, there is a complicated world that consists of various network devices such 
as Firewalls, Hubs, Routers, and Switches that pass network packets around and track 
paths between points.  Each of these devices is actually a computer system similar to a 
desktop host and many internet attackers look to these as a first line of an attack.  A 
computer network can be protected by locating it behind a firewall.  The firewall will 
limit network traffic into and out of the LAN.  To an attacker, this firewall is a gateway 
into the network.  By finding a vulnerability in the firewall and exploiting it, the attacker 
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can gain access to the entire network and all the machines protected by it.  Since these 
devices act on the TCP/IP protocol layer they too can be scanned and they too can be 
identified by Nmap and other tools by their OS Fingerprint.  A quick look at some of the 
1300 OS Fingerprints reveal hundreds of firewalls, routers and switches.  These systems 
need to have their OS Fingerprint protected as much, if not more, than the systems they 
protect.  
2. Modems 
Modems are connection points for computers into a network.  Traditionally 
modems have been used for connecting a computer to another computer over traditional 
phone lines.  Recently with the increase in broadband connection through DSL and cable 
systems, other types of modems have come to the market.  These modems connect 
computers over various media into the larger internet.  DSL modems use special high 
bandwidth phone lines and cable modems use the coaxial cable lines that also carry TV 
signals.  While these systems connect through proprietary networks, a quick search of 
the Nmap fingerprint database reveals over twenty different cable/DSL modem 
fingerprints.  These devices are visible from the TCP/IP network they provide 
connection to and from.  Additionally, these devices can provide services such as 
DHCP, firewall and port forwarding.  Many modems provide configuration through a 
built in Web service.  These network services and the modems’ network locations result 
in each device having an OS Fingerprint that is detectable and useful to a potential 
attacker.  A quick search in the Nmap fingerprint library shows that these devices are 
known and tracked.  To a network attacker the modem can be a gateway into a larger 





OS Fingerprints are a useful tool for a network attacker to identify a machine that 
may be vulnerable to a specific attack.  Network fingerprints exist because of default 
configuration and operating system variations.  Because OS Fingerprints can be detected 
and modified, it is possible to change the OS Fingerprint of one machine to look like 
another.  The prototype developed shows one possible way to modify a Linux 2.6.X 
system to have the same OS Fingerprint as a Windows NT system.  There are multiple 
methods to change the OS Fingerprint.  In the prototype developed in this effort, system 
configurations were changed and a custom modified OS kernel was created.  It is also 
possible to change the OS Fingerprint by modifying the TCP/IP packets at a router, 
switch or gateway machine.  Some systems already provide some of these capabilities 
such as Scrub from OpenBSD.  These tools modify the TCP/IP packet and can block 
packets that are used for OS Fingerprinting since some of these packets are nonfunctional 
twists of the TCP/IP protocol.   
OS Fingerprinting is still a new technology and additional capabilities are being 
generated.  In the arms race of network security, concealing the OS Fingerprint of a 
machine should be one of the ways to enhance the security of a network system.   
B. FUTURE RESEARCH 
This effort showed one example of Network Fingerprint modification.  One OS 
Fingerprint was modified to match another.  It may be possible to create a “Generic OS,” 
that can be configurable on all aspects of its OS Fingerprint dynamically and can be 
configured to match any other known OS Fingerprint.  By designing OS Fingerprint 
control into the OS, this process of changing a fingerprint could require only a change to 
a configuration file.  By modifying an OS so its fingerprint can be changed would allow 
it to react to the types of attacks detected.  An OS with this capability may be a good 
candidate for creating a “Honey Pot” or attractive trap to lure potential attackers and 
capture their activities. 
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Other future work would move beyond OS Fingerprints and into data and file 
fingerprints.  As files become larger and more complex, more and more data becomes 
included.  Applying the model used to originally create an OS Fingerprint could be 
applied to other applications, such as database or file fingerprinting.  Many files already 
carry data on when they were created, with what application and by whom, but it may 
also be possible to examine the internal structure of the file and identify non-published 
traits such as what computer the file was modified on, what OS was used or user rights 
and permissions were available.  Detecting the fingerprints left by users, applications and 
OSes on data files or databases may provide additional data.  One example of this 
approach is how Nmap scans for banners of network services to identify the application 
type and version.  While banners can be changed or removed, the actual format and 
values in the data may yet reveal information. 
Fingerprinting should also apply to different layers of the communication system.  
As we move into a more wireless world, new technologies such as infrared, cell phones, 
PDA, blackberries, pagers, blue tooth, cordless phones and wireless network devices add 
an additional layer upon the TCP/IP protocol.  These devices use various protocols to 
establish the wireless connection and then use TCP/IP or other protocols to transfer data.  
As these devices become more common they will also become more likely targeted for 
attacks.  Scanning the wireless airway for digital fingerprints of wireless devices may 
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